Rotate your phone for larger slides
PHD THESIS PRESENTATION · WESTERN SYDNEY UNIVERSITY

PRIVACY · COMPUTATION · EDGE INTELLIGENCE

Adaptive Privacy-Preserving
Machine Learning
for Resource-Constrained
Edge Intelligence

Quoc Lap Trieu

Supervisors: A/Prof. Bahman Javadi · Jim Basilakis

EDGE DEVICE SECURE INFERENCE EDGE PARTIES PRIVATE BY DESIGN

Thesis draft snapshot · 6 November 2026

Intelligence is moving closer to the data.

But the device, network and computation budget do not disappear.

◉

Personal sensing

Inference inputs may be sensitive.

▣

Distributed edge

Devices share heterogeneous resources.

⌁

Real-time decisions

Communication and delay shape usefulness.

The question is not just can we protect inference? but at what cost and under which assumptions?

Three constraints pull in different directions.

PRIVACYQUALITYCOST EDGEAI
Protect the right information

Training-record privacy, runtime input confidentiality and permitted disclosure are different requirements.

Retain useful predictions

Numerical precision, splitting, and protocol choices can change output quality or exposure.

Meet the operational budget

Compute time, communication, queueing and energy matter on heterogeneous edge hardware.

Protection requirements come first. Then optimise within the valid deployment choices.

One thesis. Three research questions.

Evidence → workload-level optimisation → protocol and party-level optimisation

RQ1

Understand the trade-offs

Compare evaluated DP, FHE and SMC paths in the context of edge requirements.

Empirical foundation
RQ2

Reduce execution cost

Numerics, preprocessing, model partitioning and request scheduling.

Time-series workloads
RQ3

Improve secure interaction

Fused non-linear operators and straggler-aware party selection.

Vision workloads
Application validation: privacy-preserving face detection, including its latency, quality and disclosure trade-offs.

Privacy mechanisms protect different assets.

A fair comparison starts with what each mechanism promises.

DP

Differential privacy

Bounds training-record influence when implemented and accounted for appropriately.

Does not, by itself, hide a new plaintext inference input.
FHE

Homomorphic encryption

Computes over ciphertext under compatible schemes and operational constraints.

Ciphertext size and supported operations affect deployment feasibility.
SMC

Secure multiparty computation

Computes collectively using protected shares under a specified party and adversary model.

Interaction, party synchronisation and disclosure boundaries matter.

There is no mechanism-independent winner.

An empirical foundation for edge decisions.

RQ1 privacy-preserving machine-learning evaluation framework architecture

Measure before selecting.

Evaluate configurations using accuracy, response time and resource demands.

Distinguish physical measurements from trace-driven simulation.

Interpret each result under its mechanism, workload and trust assumptions.

Source: Thesis, RQ1 architecture · Figure source retained from local manuscript

The central insight: requirements decide feasibility.

1

Define the protected asset

Training records, live inputs or permitted representations?

›
2

Filter eligible configurations

Trust boundary, supported operations and security parameters.

›
3

Measure application cost

Accuracy, latency, payload, energy and hardware fit.

An inexpensive inference path is not necessarily an input-confidential one.

Optimise what the secure model does.

RQ2 reduces distinct costs at the data, model and system layers.

01

Numerical selection

Accuracy-constrained bit width and precision

02

Preprocessing

Fresh, single-use Beaver triples

03

Model splitting

Secure prefix and permitted plaintext suffix

04

Request scheduling

Resource-aware party selection

The techniques are complementary, but the protection boundary must remain explicit.

Large savings in specified comparisons.

Response time
78%

reduction in the highlighted main-study comparison

Normalised illustration: baseline 100 → 22
Simulated energy
80%

reduction reached in the specified simulation comparisons

Normalised illustration of the reported maximum

These are comparison-specific, not guarantees across all models, networks or privacy requirements.

Splitting a model also moves the trust boundary.

PROTECTED
▣

SMC prefix

Secure multi-party computation

Intermediate features
➝
May be opened
AUTHORISED ENDPOINT
◈

Plaintext suffix

Lower secure-compute cost

Faster does not automatically mean the same information is hidden.

Go deeper: optimise secure interaction itself.

Non-linear operators and synchronisation are expensive in multi-party inference.

CONVENTIONAL SECURE EXECUTION

MultiplyRoundCompareReLU / max
Repeated communication and conversions

SMCMUX OPTIMISATION

Multiplication-fused
non-linear execution
Evaluated jointly with numerical selection and fine-tuning
Complement with straggler-aware party selection (SMCHDP) at the system layer.

Protocol optimisation produces measured gains.

Original thesis inference latency plot for ResNet18 RQ3 experiment
31.9%

mean secure-inference latency reduction across 16 reported configurations

58.1%

maximum reduction within those configurations

The figure illustrates a subset of model and workload cases. Results depend on configuration and baseline.

Source: Thesis, RQ3 performance evaluation · ResNet18 original figure

In synchronised SMC, one slow party matters.

P1 P2 P3 SMC
STRAGGLER

Synchronised parties

The slowest required participant can dominate group completion time.

SMCHDP placement

Uses a hierarchical, resource-aware party-selection heuristic in evaluated trace-driven simulations.

Interpret with care

Scheduling gains are separate from reduced per-inference protocol cost.

From research components to face detection.

Original thesis conceptual camera and edge-server face-detection workflow
205

Annotated Faces in the Wild (AFW) images

468

annotated faces, matched using IoU ≥ 0.5

Paired CPU evaluation. The aggressive split exposes intermediate representations to both parties.

Source: Thesis, Applied Case Study · conceptual diagram

The detector gets faster. But look at the baseline.

Direct SMC · 64-bit
326.95 s
Optimised SMC · 32-bit
46.04 s
Plaintext MTCNN
0.1255 s

Mean detector-call time · 205 paired AFW images · WSL CPU

7.10×

Faster than direct 64-bit SMC

Arithmetic-mean ratio. Still much slower than plaintext inference.

Source: Thesis case study, full 205-image benchmark · Linear relative bar scale; plaintext minimum bar is enlarged for visibility

Performance gains have a quality price.

Precision

91.45%94.99%

Fewer false positives

Recall

95.94%89.10%

More missed faces

F1 score

93.64%91.95%

Overall reduction

Direct SMC 64-bit Optimised SMC 32-bit

Lower latency must be weighed against missed detections and exposed features.

Source: Thesis case-study quality table · 468 annotations · one-to-one IoU ≥ 0.5

The strongest result is one that states its limits.

01

Threat model

SMC guarantees depend on specified parties and semi-honest execution assumptions.

02

Distinct evaluation boundaries

Physical measurements, trace-driven scheduling and application-level CPU timings are not interchangeable.

03

Disclosure and accuracy

A secure prefix with opened features does not provide end-to-end hidden representations.

04

No additive headline speedup

RQ2, RQ3 and the case study use different workloads and baselines.

What this thesis adds.

01

Evidence before optimisation

A mechanism-aware evaluation foundation that connects protection assumptions with edge resource costs.

02

SMC workload-level techniques

Accuracy-bounded numerics, fresh preprocessing, authorised model partitioning and adaptive request scheduling.

03

SMC protocol and placement techniques

Non-linear execution optimisation and straggler-aware party selection, evaluated on vision workloads.

04

Application-level trade-off evidence

A complete paired AFW face-detection analysis showing both substantial latency gains and measurable quality/disclosure costs.

Privacy should define
the design.
Efficiency should make
it practical.

Questions & discussion

Q

Quoc Lap Trieu · Western Sydney University